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Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 IO-14 EUR-25 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04

AEC-11 OMB-01 DRC-01 /164 W
---------- 126359
P R 141955Z NOV 73
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 583
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 9429

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: ADVANCED TEXT OF BELGIAN STATEMENT ON VERIFICATION AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION FOR NOVEMBER 15, 1973 PLENARY

FOLLOWING IS INFORMAL DELEGATION TRANSLATION OF BELGIAN "THEME" ON VERIFICATION AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION FOR THE NOVEMBER 15, 1973 PLENARY, AS APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP IN ITS MEETING ON NOVEMBER 14, 1973.
BEGIN TEXT:

THE HISTORY OF NEGOTIATIONS CONDUCTED OVER THESE LAST DECADES IN MATTERS OF DISARMAMENT AND THE CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS
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DEMONSTRATES THE IMPORTANCE WHICH QUESTIONS OF VERIFICATION

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HAVE ASSUMED IN THAT AREA.

THIS IS BECAUSE, IN FACT, THE SPHERE OF DISARMAMENT AND THE CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS IMPINGES CLOSELY ON THAT OF NATIONAL SECURITY, SINCE IT BEARS ON DEFENSE MEASURES IN GENERAL AND UPON ARMED FORCES IN PARTICULAR.

WHEN IT BECOMES A QUESTION OF UNDERTAKING COMMITMENTS AFFECTING ARMED FORCES FOR THE FUTURE, NATIONS CONCERN THEMSELVES (AND THERE CAN BE NO MORE LEGITIMATE CONCERN) WITH THE CONSEQUENCES WHICH SUCH MEASURES RISK IMPOSING ON THEIR NATIONAL SECURITY, NOT ONLY NATIONAL SECURITY PER SE BUT ALSO, AND PERHAPS EVEN ESPECIALLY, IN COMPARISON WITH THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES WHICH SURROUND THEM OF WHICH IT IS ABOVE ALL IMPORTANT TO TAKE ACCOUNT. THIS EXPRESSES THE PREOCCUPATION OF EACH THAT THE AGREEMENTS REACHED BE SCRUPULOUSLY RESPECTED IN THEIR CONCRETE APPLICATION.

CERTAINLY, GOVERNMENTS DO NOT HAVE THE CUSTOM OF CONCLUDING AGREEMENTS AMONG THEMSELVES WHICH THEY DO NOT INTEND TO HONOR. ONE CAN, AND EVEN SHOULD, PRESUME THAT THE SIGNED AGREEMENTS ARE DESTINED TO BE ADHERED TO, THAT IS TO SAY, TO BE APPLIED IN THE FIELD. WITHOUT SUCH AN A PRIORI TRUST ON THE PART OF THE SIGNATORIES, THERE WOULD ASSUREDLY BE HARDLY ANY SENSE IN ENTERING INTO NEGOTIATIONS AND IN REACHING AGREEMENTS.

EQUALLY, IT IS NOT HERE SO MUCH A QUESTION OF TRUST OR DISTRUST, BUT MORE OF SAFEGUARDING ONE OF THE CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OF ANY ARRANGEMENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY. IN FACT TO THE EXTENT THAT NATIONAL SECURITY DEPENDS IN LARGE MEASURE UPON ARMED FORCES, ONE CAN HARDLY ENVISAGE, NOTABLY, MAINTAINING THEM AT A REDUCED LEVEL, ON THE BASIS OF AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT THAT THIS AGREEMENT CONTINUES TO BE APPLIED BY THE OTHER PARITES, AND TO THE EXTENT THAT ONE RETAINS THE CAPACITY TO REACT IN AN APPROPRIATE AND TIMELY FASHION IN THE CASE -- HOWEVER IMPROBABLE OR UNEXPECTED IT MAY BE--INE WHICH THE AGREEMENT CEASES TO BE RESPECTED BY ONE OR SEVERAL OF THE OTHER SIGNATORIES. IT IS THEREFORE NOT SO MUCH A QUESTION OF (STRICTLY SPEAKING) GUARANTEEING OR OF FORCING RESPECT FOR THE AGREEMENTS REACHED, AS OF PUTTING EACH PARTY CONFIDENTIAL

IN A POSITION TO VERIFY THAT THE AGREEMENTS ARE CURRENTLY BEING RESPECTED BY ALL, AND OF BELIEVING THAT IF IN EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES THE AGREEMENT CEASED TO BE THUS RESPECTED, ONE WOULD KNOW ABOUT IT IMMEDIATELY AND COULD THEREAFTER WITHOUT DELAY TAKE THE NECESSARY MEASURES OF NATIONAL SECURITY.

AS THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF THE PRELIMINARY CONSULTATIONS, OF LAST JUNE 28, BEARS WITNESS, THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE

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NEGOTIATIONS HAVE AGREED THAT THE AGREEMENTS WHICH THEY HAVE IN VIEW CONCERNING THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN CENTRAL EUROPE MUST PRESERVE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR EACH OF THEM. THESE AGREEMENTS SHOULD BE CONCEIVED IN SUCH A FASHION THAT THEIR APPLICATION DOES NOT CARRY A UNILATERAL MILITARY DISADVANTAGE TO ANYONE. MY COLLEAGUES AND I THEREFORE MUST UNDERLINE THAT, IN THE VIEW OF OUR GOVERNMENTS, THESE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES CAN ONLY BE SATISFIED IF THE AGREEMENTS TO BE REACHED CONTAIN PROVISIONS INTENDED TO ASSURE THE VERIFICATION OF RESPECT FOR THE OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN.

THESE MEASURES OF VERIFICATION SHOULD THEMSELVES RESPECT THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES WHICH I HAVE JUST RECALLED. THEY SHOULD PROMISE A LEVEL OF EFFECTIVENESS SUFFICIENT TO OFFER REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THEIR END WILL BE ATTAINED, BUT AT THE SAME TIME IT IS PROPER TO PREVENT THEM FROM OVERREACHING THEIR GOAL, ENGENDERING UNILATERAL MILITARY DISADVANTAGES IN THEIR TURN. THIS IS THE MEANING OF OUR FORMULA THAT VERIFICATION MEASURES SHOULD BE IN PROPORTION TO THE NATURE AND THE EXTENT OF THE AGREEMENTS WHOSE APPLICATION IT IS A QUESTION OF VERIFYING.

THUS, IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT, AS CONCERNS REDUCTIONS OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN PARTICULAR, IF IT IS A QUESTION OF ASCERTAINING THAT THEY HAVE BEEN CONCRETELY CARRIED OUT WITHIN THE ANTICIPATED TIME ACCORDING TO THE AGREED MODALITIES, IT IS ALSO -- ANDPERHAPS EVEN ESPECIALLY -- A QUESTION OF OBSERVING THAT THESE REDUCTIONS, AFTER THEY HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, ARE NOT SUBSEQUENTLY ILLEGITIMATELY COMPENSATED FOR, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, BY NEW INCREASES. IT WILL OBVIOUSLY BE APPROPRIATE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF FLUCTUATIONS ARISING OUT OF RECOGNIZED LEGITIMATE NEEDS.

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MOREOVER, IF WE WISH OUR AGREEMENTS TO TRULY SERVE THE CAUSE OF DETENTE IN EUROPE, PROMOTING CONFIDENCE AND STABILITY, THE SIMPLE ASCERTAINING OF FACTS CANNOT SUFFICE UNLESS AN INCREASE IN CONSTANT AND EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION CLEARLY APPEARS TO BE A REALITY, NOT MERELY TO THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED BUT ALSO TO THEIR RESPECTIVE PEOPLES. THE MEASURES OF VERIFICATION WHICH MUST BE WORKED OUT THEREFORE SHOULD NOT DEPEND UPON THE SOLE UTILIZATION OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

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NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 IO-14 EUR-25 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04

AEC-11 OMB-01 DRC-01 /164 W
---------- 126435
P R 141955Z NOV 73
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 584
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
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CERTAINLY, THE FACT THAT VERIFICATION MEASURES SHOULD CORRESPOND TO THE NATURE AND THE EXTENT OF OUR FUTURE AGREEMENTS EVIDENTLY IMPLIES THAT IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO KNOW THE OUT-LINES OF THESE AGREEMENTS, OF WHICH, PRECISELY, THE VERIFICATION MUST BE ORGAINZED, BEFORE BEING ABLE TO UNDERTAKE THE WORKING OUT OF DETAILED MEASURES LOOKING TOWARDS ASSURING THIS VERIFICATION. MY COLLEAGUES AND I NEVERTHELESS CONSIDER IT NECESSARY TO ADVANCE FROM THE PRESENT TIME THE PRINCIPLE OF THE NECESSITY TO AGREE AT THE DESIRED TIME, AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF OUR AGREEMENTS, UPON APPROPRIATE MEASURES OF VERIFICATION.

THE SAME PRINCIPLES OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY AND OF THE ABSENCE OF ANY UNILATERAL MILITARY DISADVANTAGE FOR ANYBODY CARRY WITH THEM, FOR OUR PART, ANOTHER CARDINAL CONCERN, OF WHICH IT IS IMPORTANT TO TAKE ACCOUNT BY THE INSERTION OF APPROPRIATE CLAUSES IN OUR FUTURE AGREEMENTS. IT IS NECESSARY IN OUR EYES TO ASSURE THAT THE AGREEMENTS DO NOT COME TO BE UNDERMINED OR CIRCUMVENTED. CERTAIN REINFORCEMENTS OF FORCES
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OR CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES COULD, WITHOUT SO MUCH

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INFRINGING THE LETTER OF THE OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN, TWIST THE SPIRIT OF THEM TO THE POINT OF PUTTING INTO QUESTION THE VIABILITY OF THE AGREEMENTS THEMSELVES. IT WILL THEREFORE BE INDISPENSIBLE FOR US TO UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER IN GOOD TIME CONCERNING CASES OF THIS TYPE, AND TO PREVENT THEIR OCCURENCE. HERE TOO, IT IS EVIDENT THAT BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO FORMULATE THE DETAILS OF SUCH CLAUSES OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION, IT WOULD BE BETTER TO WAIT UNTIL THE OUTLINES OF THE OBLIGATIONS WHOSE EVENTUAL CIRCUMVENTION -- ACCIDENTAL OR DELIBERATE -- IT IS A QUESTION OF PREVENTING HAVE BEEN PRFILED. BUT, HERE AS IN THE PREVIOUS CASE, IT IS IMPORTANT TO STATE THE PRINCIPLE AT THE OUTSET AND TO SKETCH THE GENERAL OBJECTIVE.

VERIFICATION AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION ARE THUS ESTABLISHED AS INDISPENSIBLE COMPONENTS OF THE AGREEMENTS WHICH IT FALLS UPON THE CONFERENCE TO WORK-OUT. THEIR COMPLEMENTARY NATURE, AND THE FACT THAT THEIR DETAILED STUDY CANNOT USEFULLY BE BEGUN UNTIL LATER, DOES NOT PERMIT A CONCLUSION THAT THEY ARE AT ALL OF LESS IMPORTANCE, EITHER, IN THE SHORT RUN OR IN A LONGER RUN. THEY ARE, ON THE CONTRARY, THE FINAL TOUCHES WHICH MAKE THE WORK PERFECT. END TEXT.HUMES

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: NATIONAL SECURITY, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 14 NOV 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973VIENNA09429
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19731133/aaaaayad.tel
Line Count: 244
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 28 AUG 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <28-Aug-2001 by smithrj>; APPROVED <07 MAR 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: ADVANCED TEXT OF BELGIAN STATEMENT ON VERIFICATION AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION FOR NOVEMBER 15, 1973
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

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